Steve Webb
LOS ANGELES, CA — Dodger Stadium was rocking. The closer was on the ropes. Ohtani was on deck. The tying runs were on base. And then, POOF! In a flash, it was over as Miguel Rojas hit into a game ending triple play. Miggy ripped the ball (97 mph), but the fact that it reached third baseman Manny Machado so quickly was part of the problem, it allowed the Padres to go round the horn in plent of time to record outs at second and first in addition to the force out that Machado got from stepping on the bag. It was a jaw-dropping ending to an incredibly important game. And once again, it raises questions about the in-game decisions of manager Dave Roberts. Why didn’t he just have Miggy bunt? Well, the answer is complicated.
The Traditional Case for Bunting
Traditionally, bunting has been seen as a smart, fundamental baseball play, especially in tight games. The logic is simple: sacrifice an out to advance the runners and give the next hitters a better chance to drive them in. By laying down a successful bunt, you can move the runners to second and third, placing two men in scoring position with just one out. The next hitter doesn’t even need to get a base hit to drive in a run — a groundout or sacrifice fly could suffice.
In many cases, the bunt is viewed as a way to manufacture a run when hits are hard to come by. Managers often use the bunt to avoid rally-killing double plays, especially when facing a pitcher who’s inducing ground balls. In close, low-scoring games, it might seem like a low-risk way to put pressure on the defense and nudge a run across the plate. And in fact, in the game on Tuesday, Miguel Rojas was given the bunt sign on the first pitch of his at-bat. He showed bunt on the first offering from reliever Robert Suarez and then pulled the bat back to watch a low strike land in the zone. However, rather than squaring around a second time, Rojas was swinging away on the next pitch, resulting in the disastrous triple play.
“Yeah, definitely a tough one for myself,” Rojas said. “I’m totally confident that I can get to a fastball. Unfortunately, I hit it on the ground and it’s been tough for me the last couple of days. I haven’t been able to get the job done, but definitely this one, especially for me, I think I let the team down on that one.”
The Statistical Reality: Expected Runs
According to Roberts, the fact that Padres were running the “wheel play”–where shortstop Xander Bogaerts vacates shortstop to cover third base while Manny Machado charges to field the bunt–told him to call off the bunt on the second pitch.
“I just don’t think that you’re expecting a triple play,” said Roberts in postgame comments. “He hit the ball hard. And I just can’t play the game of, if it gets through then it’s a great play, and then if it’s hit right at him, it’s a bad play. The game tells you what to do. And in that situation, everyone is playing in, the shortstop is in the six-hole. There’s just a lot of holes out there. That’s just kind of the way you play baseball.”
“There’s less than a 1 percent chance that Shohei doesn’t come up to bat,” Roberts added. “Unfortunately, that small percentage came into play.”
The reason that the bunt was taken off was based in the moment, but its foundation goes back to a sore subject with many baseball purists: analytics. While the traditional mindset favors bunting in certain situations, modern baseball analytics have changed the perception of this strategy. Statisticians have gathered years of data to calculate expected runs based on various game situations, which allows us to see the potential impact of bunting. With runners on first and second and no outs, the decision to bunt is rarely the optimal move from a run-scoring perspective.
According to data avaialable at FanGraphs, usually a bunt is a bad decision. It reduces the run expectancy in an inning in almost every instance. For example, in the situation from Tuesday’s game (runners and first and second, nobody out), bunting runners into scoring position reduces the run expectancy from 1.373 to 1.352 expected runs per inning.
In other words, by giving away an out in exchange for advancing the runners, a team is statistically less likely to score multiple runs in the inning. The lost out hampers the team’s chances of sustaining a rally, and relying on just one or two outs to bring the runners home becomes riskier. This contrasts with the expected runs from simply swinging away, where a base hit could potentially drive in both runners, and even a well-placed ground ball might avoid a double play while still advancing the runners without sacrificing an out.
However, as you see from the chart above, the loss in run expectancy in the first and second, nobody out situation is minimal compared to other bunting situations where the the expected runs plummet. Roberts’ original call, to have Miggy bunt, was completely valid. And, he would have the top of the order coming up.
Situational Factors: When Does Bunting Make Sense?
Although the data points against bunting as a sound strategy in most cases, it’s important to acknowledge that baseball is a game of situations, and there are times when bunting can still be justified.
- Late-Game, Low-Scoring Situations: In a tight game, especially in the late innings, a manager might be more interested in scoring just one run rather than maximizing the chance for a big inning. If the game is tied or a team is down by one run, advancing the runners could make sense, particularly if a team’s strength lies in their bullpen and pitching staff. Here, the goal is to manufacture a single run to either tie the game or take the lead, rather than trying to score multiple runs.
- Weak Hitters or Double Play Risk: If the batter is struggling or is known for grounding into double plays, bunting might be seen as a better option than allowing a hitter with poor contact skills to swing away. Bunting can be used as a way to avoid a potential double play, which would erase all baserunners and severely damage the team’s chances of scoring.
- Speed on the Bases: In situations where the runners on first and second are particularly fast, bunting could be employed not just as a sacrifice but as a chance to beat out the throw and load the bases. Bunting for a base hit is much less about giving up an out and more about applying pressure on the defense, forcing them to make a quick and accurate play.
- Defensive Alignment: If the opposing team is in a defensive shift or playing the infielders deep, a bunt could exploit the positioning. While the expected runs might still suggest swinging away, certain defensive situations might make a well-placed bunt a higher-percentage play.
Modern Trends: Fewer Bunts, More Data-Driven Decisions
Over the past decade, teams have bunt less frequently as the game continues to evolve toward data-driven strategies. Analytics have shown that giving up outs to move runners, in most cases, isn’t worth the trade-off. Teams now focus more on maximizing their run-scoring opportunities by emphasizing power, patience, and getting on base, rather than relying on small-ball tactics like bunting.
In today’s game, bunting is primarily reserved for pitchers, weak hitters, or specific situations where one run is more valuable than multiple runs. Even then, many managers hesitate to use it, preferring to trust in their players’ ability to hit their way into a bigger inning.
You still need to bunt in this situation
This is a case of where maybe there might be a small statistical disadvantage in bunting the runners over, but that is COMPLETELY overshadowed by the fact that you have THREE MVPS waiting in the wings to have a crack at tying the game. You might argue that to open up first base, you’re only taking the bat out of Shohei’s hands– that Padres skipper Mike Shildt would only walk Shohei and go after the next hitter.
Fine. The next hitter is Mookie F’N Betts! Only the best hitter with runners in scoring position on the entire team. Bases loaded. One Out. Mookie at bat. Freddie on deck. I like my chances. Make Shildt make his move. And let the cards fall where they may.
Conclusion
Of course, just like the Spanish Inquisition, nobody expects a triple play. It’s an extremely rare occurence, happening on average five times per MLB season. However, the chances of Miggy–not the fleetest of runners–hitting into a double play in that situation seemed quite high, and that would do a good job of killing your rally as well. In fact, why was Miggy up there at all? Kevin Kiermaier was sitting on your bench. A left-handed hitter who is much faster than Rojas and an excellent bunter. The move should have been to pull Miggy for Kiermaier and commit to the bit. Instead, we get a Dave Roberts classic. A wishy washy half gesture, followed by an unmitigated disaster. Ugh. Painful.
Tuesday was the kind of game that puts dread into the hearts of Dodgers fans everywhere. You get the sinking feeling that this might be a very short October.
Lets’ hope that feeling is wrong, and just an undigested bit of Dodger Dog coming back to plague us the morning after. Fasten your seatbelts, folks, it’s going to be a bumpy ride.
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